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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 1.

[Inherent and inalienable rights.]

All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences;
to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
Article I, Section 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.

iv.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.
Case No. 870221-CA

THOMAS EUGENE DAVIS,
Defendant.

Priority No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set
forth in Appellant's Brief (Brief of Appellant at 1-5) with the
exception of the state's concession that Mr. Davis "testified before
the prosecutor under oath and provided detail regarding where he had
obtained most of the money."

(Brief of Respondent at 2 citing

Findings no. 16 and 17/ R. at 125). Mr. Davis takes this
opportunity to reply to portions of Respondent's Brief,

issues to

which Mr. Davis does not reply are adequately covered in Appellant's
Opening Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court retained ongoing jurisdiction to examine
the issue of return of property no longer needed as evidence.

The

statute in question unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to
Mr. Davis and unconstitutionally fails to protect Mr. Davis' due
process rights,

in any event, Mr. Davis met his burden of proof

regarding ownership of the money and therefore this Court ought to
order the money be returned to Mr. Davis.

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ONGOING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF RETURN OF PROPERTY SEIZED
DURING THE ARREST OF MR, DAVIS,
Respondent urges this Court to adopt a civil standard for
Mr. Davis's burden of proof regarding ownership and lawfulness of
the property in question.

(Respondent's Brief at 4, 7 ) . He further

indicates the standard and burden of proof would be the same whether
the matter is argued in a hearing ancillary to the criminal trial or
in a separate proceeding.

Id.

Although the matter should properly be considered
criminal, even if this Court finds the action to be quasi-criminal
in nature, the state must still provide the "basic tools of an
adequate defense or appeal."

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,

227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981).

In Little v.

Streater, the Court extended the principal of meaningful
participation to a quasi-criminal proceeding in holding that in a
paternity action, the state could not deny the putative father blood
grouping tests if he could not otherwise afford them.

In State v.

Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La. 1983) the court stated "no person may be
subjected to forfeiture of property without the right of judicial
review based on a complete record of all evidence upon which the
judgment is based."

Id. at 143 n.l.

Therefore the state should pay

for the preparation of a transcript in the present case.
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POINT II,
THE OPERATION OF UTAH CODE ANN, §77-24-2
(1953 AS AMENDED) DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS q>F LAWT
A.

THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE.

Respondent erroneously states the statute in question
provides for a hearing (Respondent's Brief at 6 ) . Although a
hearing was provided in the case at bar, the statute does not
specifically provide for a hearing.

Additionally, respondent

provides no citation for his unsupported statement, "Here
[A]ppellant was given detailed instructions concerning how he might
obtain the return of what he alleged was his lawful property."
(Respondent's Brief at 7 ) . As conceded by the state, Mr. Davis
explained how he legally obtained most of the money.

(Respondent's

Brief at 2 ) .
In State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 1140, 143 (La. 1983), the
court, in relying on the state constitution, found no person may be
deprived of property without due process of law.

Personal effects

may not be taken at all unless they are contraband.

The court found

the Louisiana state constitution requires both notice and an
opportunity to be heard and reasonable statutory restrictions and
reasonable exercise of power for valid interference with property
rights.

The constitution "requirefd] the state to prove its grounds

beyond a reasonable doubt in a judicial proceeding before . . .
property may be forfeited. . . ."

Id. at 145.

Mr. Davis cites to

Article I, Section 1 and 7 as comparable provisions in the Utah
Constitution (Reply Brief at iv) which protect his rights to be
secure in his property and to have redress of his grievances when he
is deprived of property without due process of law.

B.

MR. DAVIS WAS DENIED DOE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE
THE MATTER DECIDED BY A NEUTRAL PARTY.

Although Mr. Davis was provided a hearing reviewing the
prosecutor's decision, the matter should have been heard by a
neutral party in the first place.

Placing the burden on Mr. Davis

to show an abuse of discretion placed him in a more difficult
position than merely showing he lawfully possessed the money in
question.

As noted by the Utah Supreme Court,

ff

[T]he prosecutor's

good faith is a fragile protection for the accused."

State v.

Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), cited again in State v.
Ossana, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 16 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring).

The statute in question provides no protection other

than the thin veil of the prosecutor's good faith.
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S.
232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) relied upon by Respondent
in support of his due process argument is distinguishable from the
present case.

In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the accused was

acquitted of willfully and knowingly, with intent to defraud,
smuggling articles into the United States.

He then argued

collateral estoppel to bar the pending forfeiture proceeding.

The

Court found the forfeiture proceeding was not barred because no
intent was needed to prove the property was brought into the United
States without proper declaration.

Again, as noted in Mr. Davis'

Opening brief, Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437,
29 L.Ed. 684 (1886) controls because in Coffey, acquittal on the
criminal offense necessarily embraced the intent averred in the
- 4

-

forfeiture suit.

In other words-, where the evidence was

insufficient to link Mr. Davis1 activities to forgery, the money
cannot be considered sufficiently tainted to become derivative
contraband or otherwise uphold the state's position.
POINT III.
MR. DAVIS MET THE BURDEN OP PROOF AT THE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD ON HIS MOTION TO
COMPEL THE RETURN OF PROPERTY.
As conceded by the state, Mr. Davis explained how he
legally obtained most of the money.

(Respondent's Brief at 2 ) .

Although the state had resources to verify or refute these claims
and offered to do so, it failed to do so and failed to indicate any
valid reason for failing to do so.
4).

(Appellant's Opening Brief at

Therefore the state's argument that Mr. Davis merely made a

"conclusory statement that he was the owner, backed by unsupported
testimony of odd jobs" is without merit.

To the contrary, the state

relies in its brief on a case which indicates the rule regarding
return of property "contemplates that the claimant, by his own
testimony or affidavits, will show the court sufficient facts to
convince it of his right to possession."

State ex rel. Schillberg

v. Everett District Justice Court, 585 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Wash. 1978)
cited in Respondent's Brief at 10.
an affidavit and testimony.

Mr. Davis came forward both with

(Appellant's Opening Brief at 15,

Addendum A ) . The state could not refute his claims.
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POINT IV.
THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED THE
BURDEN OF PROOF TO MR. DAVIS, THEREBY
DENYING HIM HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
In the recent case of State v. Spooner, 42 Cr. L. 2362
La. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 18, 1988 (Addendum A ) , the court struck down
a forfeiture statute because due process concerns and state
constitutional protections for property rights were violated by
failing to require the state to bear the burden of proof.

The

statute presumed money seized in close proximity to illegal
controlled substances shall be presumed forfeitable unless the owner
proved otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court in Spooner relied on the state due process
clause to find that a property owner is entitled to a presumption of
innocence similar to that afforded an accused in a criminal case.
Because "forfeiture of derivative contraband^ is an exception to
the basic right of an individual to own private property, the state
necessarily must bear the burden of proving that the property in
question qualifies as derivative contraband."

42 Cr. L. at 2364

(emphasis in original).
Mr. Davis urges this Court to find Article I Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution compels the same result because the state has
placed an unconstitutional burden on Mr. Davis.

As in Spooner, the

only evidence concerning the source of the money was that it was
legally held by the person claiming a right to it.

As in

m
Derivative contraband as defined by the Louisiana Court is
property which is not intrinsically illegal but which is the
immediate instrument of a crime, such as automobiles, guns, or
currency. 42 Cr. L. at 2363.
- 6
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Spooner, "The state did not satisfy any standard of proof, even [by]
a preponderance of the evidence,"

42 Cr. L. at 2364.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Davis requests this
Court to reverse the trial court's decision to not compel the return
of money seized from him at the time of his arrest.

He further asks

this case to be remanded to the trial court with an order that the
trial court order the return of Mr. Davis' property.
DATED this

/S*

day of March, 1988.
& -

^LIZtyBETH K/ BOWMAN
Attorney for .Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this

DELIVERED by
March, 1988.
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day of March, 1988.
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ADDENDUM A

LOUISIANA STRIKES DOWN PRESUMPTION THAT
CASH SEIZED NEAR DRUGS IS FORFEITABLE

State must prove that cash is derivative
contraband.
Part of a forfeiture statute providing that cash seized
in close proximity to illegal controlled substances is
presumed to b4 forfeitable contraband unless the claimant proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence is
struck down by a majority of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. Due pifocess concerns and state constitutional
protections for property rights require that the state bear
the burden of proof, the majority holds. (State v.
Spooner, La Si^pCt, 1/18/88)
Property rights protected by the state constitution are
more detailed than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the ms^ority points out. Also, forfeiture's purpose, penalizing the commission of a crime, makes it
essentially criminal in nature, which calls for strong due

process protections. For these reasons, the majority reaffirms what it held several years ago: that forfeiture
statutes are constitutional only if they require the state
to prove that the property in question is forfeitable. The
presumption created by the statute impermissibly relieves the state of its burden, the majority concludes.
Mere proximity of cash to illegal drugs may give rise to
an inference that the cash is derivative contraband, but
it cannot mandate such a presumption since there are
too many other possibilities that could account for the
presence of the cash.
Concurring in the result, Justice Cole, joined by Justices Marcus and Watson, agrees that the presumption is
unconstitutional. However, he argues that forfeiture is
civil in nature and therefore would decide, as the majority says it is unnecessary to do, that the state need only
show the forfeitability of property by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Digest of Opinion: Defendant Norman Spooner appeals an
order under La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) forfeiting $1400 cash
found on his person. The statute provides that money seized in
close proximity to illegal controlled substances shall be presumed to be forfeitable contraband unless the owner thereof
proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
During the course of a lawful traffic stop, an officer became
suspicious and asked the defendant if he could search his car.
The defendant gave written consent. Two sets of scales containing cocaine residue and assorted pills, some of them controlled
substances, were found. Following the defendant's arrest, the
cash was discovered in his back pocket. The defendant pled
guilty to possession of controlled dangerous substances, and the
state filed a petition seeking forfeiture of the cash and automobile under §32:1550.
Two generic categories of property may be classified as
"contraband." Items the possession of which is intrinsically
illegal, such as illegal narcotics, are contraband per se. Things
subject to forfeiture because they are the immediate instrument of a crime, but the possession of which is not intrinsically
illegal, such as automobiles, guns, and currency, are derivative
contraband. In order to obtain the forfeiture of derivative
contraband, the statute requires the state to show that its value
is greater than $500 or that the contraband was intended for
commercial sale.
At the forfeiture hearing, the state's witnesses testified
concerning the items found in the car, that fact that ordinary
buyers would have no need for scales and other paraphernalia
found, that it was consistent for a dealer to have on hand
"downers" that were found in the car for customers to ingest
prior to taking cocaine, and that the presence of ledgers
suggested that the defendant was a distributor. The defense
called no witnesses, but a joint stipulation was entered that the
defendant's father would have testified that he gave the defendant $1500 two days before the search to travel to
California.
The trial court ordered the car and cash forfeited. It found
that the seizure had been constitutional and that the state had
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was
intended for commercial sale. With regard to the currency, the
court found that the state was entitled to forfeiture because the
defendant failed to rebut the presumption found in
§ 1550(A)(7)(c) by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the statute unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and that the
state failed to sufficiently prove that the contraband was
valued in excess of $500 or was intended for commercial sale.
Because we agree with the trial court that the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was intended
for commercial sale we need not consider the state's contention
that it may satisfy the proof requirements of § 1550(C)(3)
under a less rigorous evidentiary burden. We also agree that
the automobile was being used to transport controlled sub-

2-17-88

stances for sale and is therefore forfeitable. We turn then to
the presumption that currency found in close proximity to
controlled substances is contraband.
Under § 1550(A)(7)(c), based on the location of money at
the time of arrest, the presumption arises that it was used to
facilitate the trafficking of illegal drugs. The defendant may
rebut the presumption only by showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the money was not used to facilitate a drug law
violation.
In State v. Manuel, 426 So2d 140, 32 CrL 2362 (1983), we
established guidelines for assessing the constitutionality of
forfeiture proceedings. We noted that forfeiture proceedings
are essentially criminal in nature because their primary purpose is to penalize the commission of an offense. Thus, we said
that a statutory scheme allowing forfeiture is constitutional if
it permits the taking of property subject to the same preconditions required for a seizure of criminal evidence. We further
held that a condition of constitutionality is that the state prove
the grounds for forfeiture at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at
146-47.
We also discussed the extensive limitations placed on the
state's right to forfeit or take private property by Art. I, §4 of
the state constitution. Although the right to acquire, own, and
dispose of private property is subject to reasonable statutory
restrictions and the police power, the section provides that
"[pjroperty shall not be taken * * * except for public purposes
and with just compensation * * *. Personal effects, other than
contraband, shall never be taken." We concluded that forfeiture does not infringe upon protected property if it requires the
state to prove that the alleged contraband was used "as an
immediate instrument of crime," id. at 145, i.e., derivative
contraband.
Art. I, §2 of the state constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due
process of law." Although we do not attempt to delineate the
full range of process due a defendant in a forfeiture proceeding, we hold that the property owner is entitled to a presumption of innocence similar to that afforded an accused in a
criminal case. The burden of proving that the property is
derivative contraband must be on the state.
[Text] La. R.S. 32.1550(A)(7)(c) impermissibly relieves the
state of its burden of proving that seized currency has been
used as an instrumentality of a crime. In order to be entitled to
the presumption that the money was used as an instrumentality
of a crime, the state, under this statute, could rest its case on
the issue after simply demonstrating that the seized currency
was found "in close proximity" to illegal contraband. Such an
evidentiary presumption is clearly invalid under the established
rule of criminal law that mandatory presumptions may be
sustained only if the prosecution can demonstrate that the
presumed fact necessarily flows from the proven fact upon
which it is made to depend. * * * The fact that this defendant
was found to have $1,400 in cash in his pocket at the time
illegal drugs were discovered in the trunk of the car he had
been driving (the proven fact) does not in and of itself demonstrate that the money was in any way connected with the drugs
(the presumed fact). Proximity of the cash to the illegal
substances is one factor which the state may rely on to prove
that the money was used as an instrumentality of a crime. But
while proximity may in some cases give rise to the inference
that currency is derivative contraband, it cannot mandate a
presumption that the money is contraband. There are too
many other reasonable possibilities which could account for the
presence of the cash * * * * * *
We also find that placing the burden of proof on the
claimant under a "clear and convincing evidence" standard
violates due process guarantees provided by the United States
Constitution. * * * [T]he federal approach allows the burden
of persuasion to shift to the claimant upon an initial government showing of probable cause to institute the proceeding.
See e.g., U.S. v. $55,518.05 in United States Currency, 728
F2d 192 (3rd Cir. 1984); United States v. $2,500 in United
States Currency, 689 F2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982). However, these
cases do not suggest that the burden may be imposed on the
property owner to rebut the presumption of guilt by clear and
convincing evidence. [End Text]
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42 CrL 2363

In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the U.S.
Supreme Court identified three factors that should be considered in assessing whether a government deprivation complies
with the dictates of federal due process: (I) the privald interest
affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and (3) the
government's interest in employing the challenged procedure.
We find that the significant risk under the current statute that
currency will be forfeited even though it is not derivative
contraband outweighs the utility of the presumption; to the
state. Accordingly, we do not believe that the statute survives
constitutional scrutiny under Mathews.
[Text/ We independently determine that § 1550(A)(7)(c)
infringes upon the "far reaching" protections afforded to
private property owners by the Louisiana Constitution * * *
The basic right protected is the right to own and enjoy
private property. Forfeiture of contraband per se is not an
infringement on that right because an individual can have no
ownership interest in items that are intrinsically illegal. Forfeiture of derivative contraband * * * also does not infringe on a
protected interest because the right to own property "is subject
to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable ^xercise
of the police power/' Art. I, §4. However, because forfeiture ol
derivative contraband by the state is an exception to t^e basic
right of an individual to own private property, the state
necessarily must bear the burden of proving that the propert)
in question qualifies as derivative contraband. [End Text/
Unquestionably the state did not prove that the currency wai
contraband. The only evidence concerning the source of the
money was the stipulation that it was given to the defendant b)
his father. The amount was not so great as to itself arouse
suspicion, especially when held by someone on a cross-countn
trip. The state did not satisfy any standard of proof, even z
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse th<
judgment allowing forfeiture of the currency and remand for <
new trial on that issue. — Calogero, J.
Concurrence: I agree that the presumption established ii
§ 1550(A)(7)(c) violates the state constitution, but believe th<
issue is much closer than the majority suggests. Als|o, the
majority should not have sidestepped the issue of the state*
burden of proof: the state need only prove by a prepondjeranc
of the evidence that the money sought to be forfe ted i
derivative contraband because the forfeiture proceeding is civil
not criminal. — Cole, Marcus, and Watson, JJ.
(State v. Spooncr; La SupCt, No. 87-KK-0892. l/ift/«^f

